We build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax. We consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment. We show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low. However, if the government controls the bargaining power, then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power.
I Introduction
The minimum wage is one of the most controversial economic policies. On the one hand, a minimum wage aims to play a redistributive role by increasing income for the least skilled workers. One might however counterargue that redistributive taxation can achieve this goal in a more efficient way. On the other hand, the minimum wage is often blamed for its adverse effects on labor demand. This is true as long as labor markets are perfectly competitive. However, the minimum wage can be helpful to correct for noncompetitive wage setting (see e.g. Stigler 1946 ). In our opinion, it is therefore necessary to include optimal taxation and labor market imperfections when one considers the normative issue of the minimum wage. In this paper, we propose a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax à la Mirrlees (1971) .
To integrate explicitly the unemployment effects of a minimum wage, we consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) generate endogenous "involuntary" unemployment (i.e. some workers are willing to work at the equilibrium wage, but fail to find a job). * We thank participants of the semainr in ERMES -Paris 2. A part of this research was realized while Hungerbühler was visiting ERMES-Paris 2.
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In our model, workers differ with respect to productivity. They decide whether to search for a job, while firms search for workers to fill their job vacancies. If a worker and a firm are paired, they Nash-bargain the wage. The government observes wages, but not productivity. Hence, it faces an adverse selection problem. Since the productivity of a match is revealed through the wage and since the negotiated wage is the one that maximizes the Nash Product, incentive constraints depend only on Nash Products. However, and contrary to the standard model in contract theory, workers' participation constraints depend on a different variable than incentive constraints. In our case, the participation depends on the workers' expected incomes while searching. We show that in such a context, bunching at the bottom of the wage distribution appears at the (second-best) optimum if the workers' bargaining power is relatively low. In our model where wages are negotiated, we interpret such a bunching as an argument in favor of a binding minimum wage.
This first result holds under the assumption that the government cannot influence the workers' bargaining power. We further show that, if the government can control the bargaining power, then it is desirable to increase a relatively low bargaining power, in which case our previous argument for the minimum wage disappears.
In our model, a minimum wage is optimal when firms have a relatively high bargaining power.
This result clearly echoes the monopsony argument first noted by Stigler (1946) . He considers the usefulness of minimum wage in a context where the only departure from the Walrasian environment is that firms set the wage unilaterally without competition on the labor market.
This monopsony power distorts the wage downwards, thereby reducing workers' labor supply and eventually employment. Therefore, a binding minimum wage can restore efficiency and increases employment (along the labor supply), provided its level remains below the competitive wage level. This argument for a minimum wage is clearly an efficiency argument, while our argument is related to an efficiency-equity trade-off. types of imperfectly substitutable workers and endogenous hours of work à la Stiglitz (1982) .
He shows that a minimum wage is never optimal in conjunction with the optimized nonlinear income tax, because a rise in the minimum wage strengthens the relevant incentive constraint.
In our model, search frictions drive a wedge between (marginal) productivity and the wage, while productivity and hours of work are exogenous. Furthermore, we consider a model with a continuum of productivity whereas he has only two types of labor.
Finally, we extend the model of optimal redistributive taxation in a search equilibrium framework developed by Hungerbühler, Lehmann, Parmentier and Van der Linden (2006, henceforth HLPV). Contrary to HLPV, we allow the bargaining power to be lower than the one prescribed by the so-called Hosios (1990) condition. In such a case, a rise in wage for a given level of the Nash Product increases workers' expected income. As we show, this effect opens the room for a welfare-improving role of the minimum wage.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the basic model, including incentive and participation constraints. Next, in Section III, we solve the model for a given bargaining power. We show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power is sufficiently low. However, the following section IV considers the case when the government can control the bargaining power. Finally, we conclude in Section V.
II The model
Our model follows the framework built in HLPV to deal with the optimal tax problem of Mirrlees (1971) within the equilibrium unemployment theory of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) . To keep things as simple as possible, we consider a static setting which has become standard in the models of search equilibrium with taxation (see also Boone and Bovenberg, 2002) . There is a mass 1 of risk-neutral individuals. Their preferences on consumption and leisure are assumed quasi-linear in consumption. Individuals differ with respect to their productivity a ∈ [a 0 , a 1 ] with 0 ≤ a 0 < a 1 < ∞ according to the continuous density function f (a) and the cumulative density function F (a) 1 . These functions are common knowledge, while the productivity is private information to the worker. The timing of the model is as follows:
1. First, the government commits to its policy. The policy consists in a tax schedule T (.), a welfare benefit b and a minimum wage w. Since the government cannot observe the individuals' productivity but only their wages, this tax schedule is conditional on the gross wage w only. The government cannot observe whether an non-employed individual has searched for a job but not found one (hence, she is unemployed) or simply not searched for a job at all (hence, she is out of the labor force). Consequently, all non-employed individuals get the same welfare benefit b (whatever their productivity and their participation decision). In section IV only, we assume that the government has an additional policy instrument: It can control the workers' bargaining power β.
2. In a second step, individuals and firms decide to participate in the labor market. The individuals have the binary choice to invest all their leisure time in search for a job or to stay out of the labor force and enjoy utility from leisure, d > 0, and the welfare benefit b.
They do decide to participate in the market if their expected income is above the utility of staying out of the labor force. Firms on their side can decide to open job vacancies. To do so, they first have to invest capital to build up the workstation. This capital investment is assumed irreversible and productivity-specific, i.e. to be able to hire a worker of ability a, 1 Our results still hold if a1 → ∞ as long as
the firm has to buy κ a units of capital. Conversely, an individual of ability a can only work at a firm that has made the appropriate investment in equipment, i.e. that has invested the exact amount κ a of capital. We simply assume that
i.e. a higher-productivity individual needs more capital, but not too much more. Firms decide to enter the labor market as long as the expected profit is positive.
3. Next, individuals and firms match on their skill-specific labor markets. To model the search frictions, we use a standard matching function. The number of matches is a function of the number of individuals searching for a job and firms searching for a worker. Capital investment and labor markets are productivity-specific. In this sense, we assume directed search 2 . The outcome of this matching process determines the unemployment rate in our model. During this matching process, the firm observes the productivity of the worker.
Unmatched firms loose their invested capital.
4. The worker and the firm bargain the gross wage that is paid to the worker.
5. Production and transfers occur.
II.1 The matching process, participation decisions and employment
The matching function H(U a , V a ) in labor market a gives the number (measure) H a of employed individuals of type a as a function of the number U a of workers searching for a job, and the number V a of job vacancies. This matching function is assumed to represent heterogeneities and frictions that we do not model explicitly. It is usually assumed that the matching function H(., .) is increasing in both its arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree 1. Empirical studies have found that a Cobb-Douglas approximation of the matching function fits the data well (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001 ). We therefore assume that the matching function is given by
where A > 0 is a scale parameter of the matching function. If individuals of type a search for work, then U a = f (a), otherwise U a = 0. The probability for a firm to hire a worker
is a decreasing function of the number of vacancies, while the probability L a for a searching worker to find a job increases in the number of vacancies.
To produce a units of output, the firm has to invest κ a units of capital, open a vacancy and find one worker of type a. Since the investment takes place before the matching to the worker, 2 While the government does not observe a workers' productivity, we assume that firms observe it after a match. Hence, if a type a worker search on a type t 6 = a labor market and finds a job, the match becomes unproductive and the worker is fired. Since search is costly for workers, we get that a type-a has no incentive to search on another labor market. some firms do not find a worker. In that case, the loss of the firm is equal to the investment κ a . If the firm finds a worker for its vacancy, then they have to bargain about the gross wage w a and the firm's profit writes a − w a − κ a . Since the probability that a firm finds a worker of type a is equal to H a /V a , the expected profit can be written as (H a /V a ) (a − w a ) − κ a . Firms enter the market as long as the expected profits are positive. Hence, this expected profit is nil at equilibrium. This free-entry condition determines the number of vacancies, and thereby the probability L a = H a /U a for a type-a searching worker to find a job, which is given by:
If the wage w a decreases, then the firm's surplus a − w a increases relative to the vacancy cost κ a , and hence, firms create more vacancies and the probability of finding a job increases for type-a searching workers. An additional firm that enters the market increases employment and therefore gross output. But it also increases the resources spent for capital investments. The impact of an additional vacancy on net output (net of investment costs) is then ambiguous and depends on the number or vacant jobs that are already on the labor market. If the wage is sufficiently low, the firm has incentives to enter the market, even though this might not be optimal from a social point of view, because too many resources might then be spent for capital investments. The gross output generated by workers of type a is equal to aL a f (a). Let
Output net of investment costs on the type-a labor market can then be written as Y a f (a). Using equation (3) , one gets
Because of free entry, firms' expected profits equal 0, so their total surplus (a − w a ) L a f (a) equals total investment costs V a κ a . As a consequence, net output consists only in the total gross wages of workers, w a L a f (a). Net output is an inverse-U shaped function of gross wage.
A type-a participating worker finds a job with probability L a . In this case, she gets the wage w a and has to pay income taxes T (w a ). If she doesn't find a job, her income consists of the welfare benefit b. The (ex-ante) expected income of a searching individual equals
If the individual decides to stay out of the labor force, then she gets the welfare benefit b and enjoys her leisure time which gives her utility d. Hence, the individual participates in the labor market as long as
By defining worker's ex-post surplus as x a ≡ w a − T (w a ) − b and worker's expected surplus from participation as Σ a ≡ x a L a , one gets:
Then, the participation constraint for type-a workers simplifies to
II.2 The wage bargain
At this stage of the game, the entry costs are sunk. If there is an agreement between the firm and the worker on the wage w, the output is produced and the firm pays the worker the negotiated wage. In the absence of an agreement, nothing is produced, and the worker only gets the welfare benefit b. The rent of the worker is therefore equal to x = w − T (w) − b, whereas the rent of the firm equals a − w. As it is standard in the literature, we assume that the wage negotiation amounts to maximize the Nash Product defined by
where β ∈ (0, γ) denotes the worker's relative bargaining power. Note that the constants A and κ a enter multiplicatively, so their inclusion does not change the outcome of the bargain.
We restrict the bargaining power β to values below the elasticity of the matching function, γ, because we only find for these values interesting results concerning the minimum wage. Hence
As we will show later, the minimum wage appears at the optimum as soon as β < γ. If the wage that maximizes the Nash product N (w, x, a), lies below the minimum wage w, then the minimum wage must be paid to the worker. This leads to:
where T a ≡ T (w a ) denotes the level of taxes and T 0 a ≡ ∂T (w a )/∂w a denotes the marginal tax rate paid by a worker with gross income w a . To simplify notations in what follows, we define the maximized Nash product N a as
. Given this definition, we can rewrite the worker's expected surplus from participation as
II.3 The government's problem
II.3.1 Incentive constraints
Since the government only observes the income w of employed individuals but not their productivity a, it faces an adverse selection problem. Therefore, the government has to choose a menu of allocations (w a , x a ) a that leads agents to reveal their ability. By determining the wage w a , agents send a "message" about their productivity. The particularity of this problem in our context is that the message is here jointly determined by the worker and the firm of a match. However, since the wage maximizes the Nash product N (w, x, a), we treat this problem as if a single agent chooses the wage that maximizes N (w, x, a) 3 . Therefore we can apply standard techniques (see e.g. Salanié 2002 ) and express incentive constraints in terms of Nash products. Using the taxation principle, it is equivalent to design a tax function T (w) or to let the firm-worker pair choose among the menu of proposed allocations (w a , x a ) a . To be optimal, the allocations must induce the individual matches to truthfully reveal their type, which is the case for a worker of type a if and only if
In other words, a worker-firm pair of type a prefers the wage w a designed for it (which induces the workers' ex-post surplus to be x a = w a − T (w a ) − b), instead of wage w a0 designed for any other type a 0 (which induces the workers' ex-post surplus to be equal to
Since at a constant value for the Nash product, we have that the marginal rate of substitution between the wage w and the worker's ex-post surplus x
is decreasing in a, the single-crossing property is fulfilled. This allows us to replace the incentive constraint (See Appendix A) by the first-order conditioṅ
and the second-order conditionẇ
If this second-order incentive constraint is binding at the bottom of the wage distribution, we interpret this result as a minimum wage 4 . Equation (12) helps us to explicit the path that is followed by Σ a . We then get the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 The worker's expected surplus Σ a is increasing in a. Hence, there exists a single type
Proof. The log-differentiation of (9) giveṡ
For further discussions, see HLPV.
Together with (12) , one getṡ
The first term on the right-hand side is positive from (1). When assumption (7) is met, the second-order incentive constraintẇ a ≥ 0 implies that the second term on the right-hand side is nonnegative. Hence, Σ a is increasing in a. Therefore, there exists a single type a d for which the participation constraint is binding.
II.3.2 The government's objective and budget constraint
As in HLPV, we assume that the government cares only about the distribution of expected utilities, i.e. Σ a + b for the participating types and b + d for the non participating ones. We assume the following objective to the government:
where Φ (.) is a twice continuously differentiable, increasing and concave function. This formulation admits as a limiting case the maximin criterion. Using the definition of the worker's expected surplus (5), one can rewrite this objective as
The budget constraint can be written as
where E ≥ 0 denotes exogenous public expenditures. This constraint is equivalent to the resource
where the left-hand side denotes total production net of vacancy costs and the right-hand side the distribution of these available resources to all workers.
Hence, the government maximizes its objective (14) , subject to the budget constraint (15), the first-order incentive constraint (12), the second-order incentive constraintẇ a ≥ 0 and the
To concentrate on the issue of the minimum wage, we only allow bunching at the bottom of the wage distribution and do not treat the cases where the second-order incentive constraint is binding elsewhere. To solve this problem, we take the logarithm of Nash products, log N a , as the state variable, while the control variables are the negotiated wages w a , together with the minimum wage w (in case of bunching at the bottom), the welfare benefit b and the participation threshold type a d . If the minimum wage is binding we denote by a m the highest type for which the wage is equal to the minimum wage w.
III The optimum for a given bargaining power
This section describes the optimal choices of the government if it cannot influence the workers' bargaining power. We first describe the optimal choices for welfare benefit b, the wages w a in
[a m , a 1 ], the threshold a d , and finally for the minimum wage w. The mathematical derivations of the optimality conditions are in Appendix B.
III.1 Optimal welfare benefit b
Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint (15) and consequently the shadow cost of public funds. The optimal condition for the welfare benefits is:
When b increases by one unit, the utility of non-participating individuals increase by
while the expected utility of participating individuals of type t increases by Φ 0 (b + Σ t ). At the optimum, the total of these gains has to equal the shadow cost of public funds, λ.
III.2 Optimal negotiated wages w a
For all a > a m , wages are the outcome of the Nash bargain and not constrained by the minimum wage. The optimality condition with respect to the negotiated wage gives the following equityefficiency trade-off:
Informationnal rents effect (17)
Bargaining power effect where
Consider the optimization problem for agents of type a. The Nash product N a for this type is predetermined by the Nash product of types a 0 < a and the first-order incentive compatibility constraint (12) .
The first term in equation (17) stands for the efficiency part of the trade-off. An increase in the wage rate w a implies that less firms enter the market, which has two consequences. First, it decreases employment and therefore gross output. But it also decreases the resources used for investments in capital to build workstations. The effect on output net of investment costs equals ∂Y a /∂w a and is therefore ambiguous (see equation (4)). Multiplying this by the shadow cost λ of public funds and the measure f (a) of type-a workers gives the Efficiency term in (17).
The second term in equation (17) represents the impact on informational rents of a higher gross wage for type-a workers. When firm-worker matches endowed with productivity a earn higher gross wages (while keeping the Nash product N a fixed), more productive firm-worker matches find it more attractive to mimic them. In other words, a type-t > a worker-firm pair finds it profitable to choose the wage w a designed for type-a jobs instead of the wage w t designed for them.
x a x a ' Figure 1 : The informational rent effect Figure 1 illustrates this point. It displays the iso-Nash curves for types a and t with t > a. Because productivity is higher, the elasticity of the firm's surplus with respect to gross wage is smaller for pairs of type t than for pairs of type a. Consequently, the iso-Nash curves corresponding to type a are steeper than iso-Nash curves corresponding to type t (see Equation   11 ). For a given level of Nash produt accruing to type a, the governement can select different budles, for instance a low wage combined with a low ex-post surplus (w a , x a ) or a higher wage combined with a higher ex-post surplus (w 0 a , x 0 a ). If the governement chooses (w a , x a ), it has to give a Nash product at least equal to N t to prevent type-t worker-firm pairs to mimick type-a pairs. If the governement however chooses the allocation (w 0 a , x 0 a ), then, it has to give a Nash product N 0 t , which is strictly higher than N t . Hence, the higher the wage w a the higher the Nash product for types t above a, which means that a higher wage increases informationnal rents.
In the "informationnal rent" term of equation (17), the term in front of Z a measures the rate at which the growth rate of the worker's maximized Nash product has to increase to prevent slightly more productive matches from mimicking the type a match.
However, a rise in the Nash product accruing to type t has to spill over to the Nash products for all types r above t to prevent the mimicking of the latter type by the former types. Looking at equation (12), we conclude that this rise is equi-proportional, so that ∆N r /N r = ∆N t /N t . The increase in the Nash product obtained by type-t worker-firm pairs increases the social welfare by Φ 0 (Σ t ), but implies a budgetary cost equal to λ. Integrating these two terms over all types t above a gives the shadow cost Z a of a relative increase of the type-a Nash product (see equation (18)) 5 . We get the following Lemma, which is proved in Appendix B.2:
Lemma 2 The shadow cost Z a of a relative increase in the Nash product is positive for all a < a 1 .
In other words, the governement wish to minimize informationnal rents.
A third effect appears in the present model due to the fact that workers' bargaining power β is below the elasticity of the matching function, γ. In our model, the expected surplus Σ a that the government focuses on does not coincide with the Nash product N a that the firm and the worker maximize when they negotiate the wage. For a given maximized Nash product N a (that is predetermined by the incentive constraints), a change in the wage w a has also an impact on the expected surplus Σ a as described in equation (9) .
The intuition is depicted in Figure 2 . Both Nash product N a and workers' expected surplus Σ a are increasing functions of workers' ex-post surplus x a and of firms' surplus a − w a (thereby a decreasing function of the gross wage w a ). However, if the Hosios condition β = γ is not fulfilled, they put different relative weights on these two components. Hence, the marginal rate of substitution between gross wages w a and workers' ex-post surplus x a that keep workers' expected surplus Σ a unchanged differ from the one that keep Nash product N a unchanged. Since β < γ, the Nash product criterion puts a higher relative weight on wages. Hence, increasing the wage w a for given Nash product N a increases workers' expected surplus Σ a , while increasing the wage w a for given workers' expected surplus Σ a decreases the Nash product N a . This implies that the iso-Nash curves are steeper than the corresponding iso-expected-surplus curves. When the employment level decreases by an increase in gross wages from w 1 to w 2 , the net income has to rise from x 1 to x 2 to give the same Nash product as before to this firm-worker match. In terms of expected surplus, this increase in net income more than compensates for the employment loss due to the relatively small increase in gross wages. The expected surplus therefore increases.
The increase in Σ a is valued at the marginal social utility of type a, namely Φ 0 a . Since the government thus gives more resources to agents of type a, less resources can be affected to redistribution toward other individuals. This decrease in budgetary funds is valued at the marginal cost of public funds λ. An increase in the wage rate is therefore desirable if type a is a low-productivity type that gets a lower expected surplus than the high-productivity type because of the first-order incentive constraint. Giving resources to this low-productivity type is socially valuable because it increases equity. The contrary is true if type a is a high-productivity type from whom the government wants take resources in order to redistribute. 5 Formally Za is the co-state variable associated to the state variable log Na. 
III.3 Optimal participation a d
The optimal participation decision sets the optimal value of the threshold type a d and writes
The left-hand side of (19) corresponds to the efficiency part of the trade-off. When a d decreases, participation increases by an amount that is proportional to the density f (a d ). The participation of these workers increases total net output by Y a d but requires that they receive an expected surplus at least equal to d to participate. This net budgetary gain is socially valued at the shadow cost of public funds, λ. The right-hand side of (19) is the equity part of the trade-off.
When a d decreases, worker-firm pairs with productivity a d have the possibility to mimic the additional participants. To avoid this mimicking, the government has to give an additional informational rent to type-a d matches. The term in front of Z a d is equal to the relative increase in the Nash product that should be given to type-a d matches to prevent them from mimicking the new entrants. The equity cost multiplies this increase by the shadow cost Z a d of a relative increase in the Nash product N a d .
III.4 Optimal minimum wage w
Next, consider the optimality condition with respect to the minimum wage w, which is again developed in the Appendix:
An increase in the minimum wage has three effects. The first term captures the efficiency effect. In accordance with common wisdom, a higher minimum wage decreases employment (and hence increases unemployment). Even though this leads to a lower gross output,the higher wage also implies that less resources are spent by firms investing in new workstations. Therefore, the effect on net output ∂Y a /∂w a (w) is ambiguous.
The second term captures the effect of the increase in the expected surplus of the workers that are paid at the minimum wage.
The second term captures the effect on the expected surplus of the workers of types a in [a d , a m ] whose wages are given by the minimum wage. The effect of a marginal increase ∆w of the minimum wage on the expected surplus of these workers is twofold. First, the rise in the minimum wage reduces the labor demand. Equation (3) implies that a rise ∆w of the minimum wage decreases the probability for a type a searching worker to find a job by
. Second, the government has to increase w − T (w) to keep type-a d workers in the labor force.
Hence, one has
to keep type a d workers indifferent between participating or not. The net effect on worker' ex-
At a given wage level, the probability of finding a job is relatively less sensitive to wage for workers of a higher productivity. Hence, for a > a d , the net effect of a rise in minimum wage on workers' expected surplus is positive. The induced increase in Σ a has a direct consequence on the government's objective that is valued at a rate Φ 0 (Σ a ), and a negative effect on public funds that is valued at rate λ.
Finally, a rise in the minimum wage changes the level of the Nash product for the workers of the limiting type a m . Firms' ex-post surplus a m − w a m decreases by −∆w while workers' ex-post surplus increases by ∆ (w − T (w) − b), so the net effect equals to
However, this relative change in the Nash product of these workers spills over the whole distribution of productivity through the incentive constraints. Since Z a is the shadow cost of a relative increase in the Nash product, the last term of equation (20) represents the effect of minimum wage on the individuals whose wage is not constraint by the minimum wage.
From this optimality condition on the minimum wage, we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If β < γ, a binding minimum wage is optimal.
Proof. Consider by contradiction the case where there is no binding minimum wage. In this case, one has a m = a d and equation (20) simplifies to:
Since β < γ, the terms in the barcket is positive. Furthermore, Z a d is positive too from Lemma 2. Therefore, one finds that, starting from a situation with no minimum wage, an increase in w that makes the minimum wage binding is welfare-improving.
To recommend a minimum wage even though it increases unemployment might seem slightly counterintuitive at first sight. To explain the mechanisms that lie behind this result, start from the case where there is no binding minimum wage (hence a m = a d ). Now, consider an increase in the wage of type a d above the wage w a d that solves equation (17). Given that the participation constraint for a d has still to hold with equality, equation (9) implies that this increase in the wage decreases the maximized Nash product N a d . This initial level of the maximized Nash product is however important: Through the first-order incentive constraint (12), it determines the evolution of the Nash product for all types. These Nash products then again determine the surplus given to individuals by (9) . Hence, decreasing the initial maximized Nash product N a d
by an increase in w a d implies that the rents for all types a > a d decrease. This mechanism thus allows the government to extract more resources from the high-productivity individuals (a > a d ).
These resources are then available for redistributive purposes of the government. However, since all wages for higher-productivity types solve equation (17), the increase in w a d implies that there is a downward jump in wages right above a d . This clearly violates the second-order incentive constraint. As a consequence, the optimal solution exhibits bunching at the bottom of the wage distribution. Such a bunching can be interpreted as a binding minimum wage.
Technically speaking, the new feature of our model is that while the worker and the firm maximize the Nash product, the participation constraint depends on another variable, the expected surplus. However, the Nash product and the expected surplus are related through equation (9) . In the traditional adverse selection model in contract theory, the variables concerning the agent's maximization problem and the participation constraint are the same. Therefore, the principal cannot affect the maximized utility of the lowest participating type. The lowest maximized utility is simply given by the participation constraint, and the incentive constraints give the evolution of the maximized utility across types. In our model, things are different. Even though the expected surplus of the lowest participating type must equal the outside option (i.e.
the utility of leisure in our case), the government can decrease the level of the maximized Nash product by imposing a very high wage on the lowest participating individual (see equation (9)).
This implies through the incentive constraints that the Nash products of all types decrease, and, again by equation (9), expected surplus of all individuals above the lowest type decreases.
Hence, this allows the government to decrease informational rents of the agents and use these resources for redistributive purposes, which in turn increases social welfare. However, choosing a very high wage for the lowest participating individual inevitably violates the second-order incentive constraint. As a consequence, there is bunching at the bottom of the wage distribution in the second-order approach, and since this constraint is on the wage, we can interpret this bunching as a minimum wage.
IV Varying bargaining power
The previous section considered the optimal policy if the bargaining power is exogenous. This section has a look at what happens when the government can also influence the worker's bargaining power β. There might be different ways how the government can affect the bargaining power. The law can change the bargaining procedures, or the way unions are financed, etc.
Explaining in more details how bargaining power is changed is beyond the scope of the paper.
We simply assume that the government has some degree of latitude about the bargaining power through institutional settings.
The envelope theorem implies that dΩ dβ = ∂Ω ∂β . Analyzing this last expression, we can derive the following proposition, which is proved in Appendix C:
Proposition 2 A worker's bargaining power β that is below the elasticity of the matching function, γ, is never optimal.
To understand this result, one might identify the distortions that are present in the (secondbest) optimum. In the absence of redistribution (Φ 00 (.) = 0) and under the Hosios condition (i.e. β = γ), wages maximize net output. Since the government wants to redistribute from high-to low-income individuals, it wants to install a high marginal tax rate. According to equation (8) , this distorts the wage downwards. However, the bargaining power also distorts the wage levels.
A higher bargaining power increases the wage, again according to equation (8) . Therefore, a rise in the bargaining power induces a distortion on the wage that (partly) offsets the one induced by the redistributive taxation. The equity-efficiency trade-off becomes less severe the higher the worker's bargaining power β. An increase in β is thus always desirable, at least up to the point where γ = β.
We are not able to find analytical results for the case where β > γ. Our result holds as long as Σ a is increasing in a, that is, as long as the desired redistribution goes from high-to low-productive workers. We can however prove Lemma 1 only for the cases where β ≤ γ. If β > γ, then the worker's expected surplus at the optimal solution might not be monotonically increasing in a anymore.
To understand why we need workers' expected surplus Σ a increasing in types-a for our result that a rise in workers' bargaining power is welfare-improving, we have to analyze whether a rise in the bargaining power β relaxes or strengthens the relevant incentive constraints. When workers' expected utility Σ a increases with their productivity a, the relevant incentive constraint is that a type-a match does not want to mimic slightly less productive matches. In other words, when they negotiate the wage, the relevant incentive constraint induces the worker and the firm of a type-a job to choose the wage w a designed for them, and not the wage w a−da designed for slightly less productive jobs of type a − da. Obviously, the higher the worker's bargaining power β, the harder it becomes for the firm to obtain w a−da as the bargaining outcome instead of w a . Therefore, a rise in the bargaining power β relaxes the incentive constraints that prevent worker-firm pairs from mimicking less productive worker-firm pairs, which explains why in such a context, the government can achieve a better outcome.
V Conclusion
We have given a sufficient condition for the minimum wage to be a part of the optimal redistributive policy: If the bargaining power is lower than the elasticity of the matching function, then the introduction of a binding minimum wage is welfare-improving. However, if the government can also control the workers' bargaining power, it should increase it, at least up to a point where our argument in favor of minimum wage does no longer apply. Hence, our argument in favor of the introduction of a binding minimum wage only holds if the government cannot control the bargaining power, and if this parameter is relatively low.
Whether and how the government can affect the bargaining power is still an open question.
It would also be interesting to determine the optimal level of the bargaining power when income taxation is simultaneously optimized. We have shown that as long as the workers' expected surplus remains increasing in types, increasing the bargaining power is welfare-improving because it relaxes the relevant incentive constraint. Hence, since the workers' expected surplus is increasing whenever the bargaining power is not higher than the elasticity of the matching function, this suggest that the optimal bargaining power in our redistributive context is higher than the one prescribed by Hosios (1990) in a pure efficiency context. We left the further characterization of the optimal bargaining power for future research. Furthermore, it might be interesting to see whether it is possible to generalize the framework developed in the present paper to other models of adverse selection.
VI Appendix

A Incentive constraints
We only allow bunching to appear at the bottom of the wage distribution. Let a m be the highest type where bunching occurs. We assume that a 7 → (w a , x a ) is everywhere continuous and continuously differentiable on [a m , a 1 ]. Let n (a, t) denotes the logarithm of the Nash product for a type-a job when the negotiated wage is the one designed for type-t job. Without any loss of generality, we restrict t to be in [a m , a 1 ]. This is because bundles (w a , x a ) designed for worker-firm pairs below a m are identical. Hence n (a, t) is twice continuously differentiable and:
his leads to:
A type-a worker-firm match chooses the wage designed for it if and only if the function t 7 → n (a, t) reaches its maximum for t = a, for a ≥ a m and for t = a m for a ≤ a m . For a ≥ a m , one gets on the one hand log N a = n (a, a), and the first-order condition ∂n/∂t (a, a) = 0 on the other hand. Combining both impliesṄ a /N a = ∂n/∂a (a, a). For a ≤ a m , one gets on the one hand log N a = n (a, a m ), wich again impliesṄ a /N a = ∂n/∂a (a, a). Hence, (12) holds everywhere. For a ≥ a m , differentiating the first-order condition 0 = ∂n/∂a (a, a) with respect to a gives:
Therefore, the second-order condition ∂ 2 n/∂a 2 (a, a) ≤ 0 is equivalent to ∂ 2 n/∂a∂t (a, a) ≥ 0, which implies the second-order incentive constraint (13) . The proof of the reciprocal that verifies that whenever (12) 
B The government's problem
To solve the maximization problem, we substitute workers' expected surplus and express it in terms of wages, using the participation constraint (6), the first-order incentive constraint 12 and the equation that links the Nash product N a to the workers' expected surplus (9) . The worker's expected surplus at a d is given by the participation constraint and equation (5):
Since on the interval [a d , a m ] the wage is constant and equal to w, one gets for all types a ∈ [a d , a m ]
Next, consider a > a m . Integrating equation (12) gives:
his last equation together with equation (9) at a and at a m and equation (23) for a = a m leads to
· exp
B.1 Optimality conditions with respect to negotiated wages w a for all a ∈ (a m , a 1 ]
We consider the effect of a variation δw in the wage w a for the agents of type [a, a + δa[ with δw and δa being infinitesimally small and a > a m . Equation (24) then implies
for a + da < t,
for a ≤ t < a + δa and δΣ t = 0, for t < a.
From the budget constraint (15), we can express the welfare benefits as a function of wages to get:
From the government's objective (14) , one has
where we define the shadow cost of public funds λ by Equation 16 ). Hence
which gives (17).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From Lemma 1, we know that Σ a is increasing in a. Hence the marginal social welfare Φ 0 (b + Σ a ) is decreasing in a. The shadow cost of public funds λ equals the average of all marginal social welfare (see equation 16) . Hence there exists a unique a c for which Φ 0 (b + Σ a ) = λ. For all t < a c , we get Φ 0 (b + Σ t ) > λ and Σ t < Σ ac , while for t > a c , we get Φ 0 (b + Σ t ) < λ and
Hence we get from (18):
where E f is the expectation operator under distribution f for t, 
If the minimum wage is binding (so a m > a d ) then w a d =w. One then gets from the budget constraint (15)
Finally, from the government's objective one gets δΩ = λδb + R a 1 a d δΣ a f (a) da. Taking equation (18) into account, we then obtain (19).
B.4 Optimality condition with respect to the minimum wage w
Consider a variation of the minimum wage of dw. This implies an increase in the wage, but also an increase in the amount of types for whom the minimum wage is relevant, as illustrated in figure 3 . Hence, we calculate the direct effects of a variation in a m at a given minimum wage w, and then the direct effects of a variation in the minimum wage w for a given a m . 
And from (15)
Finally, from (14) ∂Ω ∂a m = 0
Hence we can concentrate on the direct effect of w for a given a m for all variables of interest Σ t , b, Ω.
Effect of w for a given a From (23), we get for all a ∈ [a d , a m ]:
From (24), we have for all a ∈ [a m , a 1 ]
From (15) we find:
Finally, from (14) :
After some manipulations, one then gets
Together with (18), we obtain (20).
C Proof of Proposition 2
From equation (23) • for a ∈ (a m , a c ), we have Φ 0 (b + Σ a ) ≥ λ and thus
• for a ∈ (a c , a 1 ), we have Φ 0 (b + Σ a ) ≤ λ and thus 
